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EDWARD COOPER AS CURATOR OF THE CIVIL RULES
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.*
Ed Cooper has had a salient role in maintaining the Rules Com-
mittee process as a highly competent and stable element of lawmak-
ing in this country. He is a consummate master of civil procedure
and acutely understands the constitutional and political milieu in
which the Rules process functions. Along with other similarly com-
petent and observant Reporters, including the senior serving Re-
porter, Dan Coquillette, he has helped keep the Rules process and
product as evenhanded as can be expected in our complicated legal
system.
The formal history of the Civil Rules process has been well
recounted by Peter McCabe in Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Pro-
cess.1 An informal history may also be of interest. The Federal Rules
as promulgated in 1938 were only vaguely understood by most law-
yers, as is the case with any group's response to something new.
Only lawyers frequently appearing in federal court would have read
the new Rules, and even they could not have fully appreciated what
was involved. What was involved, first, was a radical reduction in the
significance of pleading: "short and plain statement"2 replaced the
Code formula "facts constituting a cause of action."3 At the same
time, there was a great increase in the weaponry of discovery. The
scope of discovery was broadly defined in the Federal Rules as
"reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence,"4
in place of relevant evidence 5 or, in many states, "relevant and nec-
essary" evidence at common law.6 The devices of discovery were rad-
ically expanded to include all those available in any of the existing
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1. Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1655,
1658-64 (1995).
2. FED. R. Ctv. P. 8.
3. See Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 824 (1924) (explain-
ing the pleading standards under the Code).
4. FED. R. Clv. P. 26.
5. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REv. 691, 698-700 (1998) (explaining how discovery oper-
ated in the federal courts before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
6. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. art. 29, § 288 (Cahill 1928) (permitting a party to depose any
other party whose testimony "is material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of the
action").
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state systems: depositions of parties and witnesses, 7 demands for
documents,8 requests for admission,9 and physical examination of
personal injury claimants.'0 The new joinder rules virtually elimi-
natedjoinder problems in most federal cases" except for those im-
posed by the constraints of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
2
Almost any major law reform becomes absorbed and appreciated
only by degrees, understood not by reading but by use. Use of the
new Federal Rules was primarily in the hands of lawyers exper-
ienced in federal courts and the judges then on the federal bench.
They all were long experienced in the previously existing systems,
and it took a while to overcome old habits of thought. The normal
slow learning curve was interrupted by the coming of World War II.
During the war, most people, including many lawyers, had more
important concerns.
I entered law practice in 1954 in the remote province of Oregon.
The trial bar in the Oregon federal court had by then become used
to the new regime. The Federal Rules were applied to the very ordi-
nary kinds of civil cases in that court. These were diversity cases,
including personal injury and commercial cases, and federal claims
cases, such as Federal Employers Liability Act claims, occasional se-
curities cases, and litigation with the federal government. The style
in litigation was small-city courtesy. The range of federal court liti-
gation in larger urban centers was much broader, the volume much
greater, and the style generally more aggressive.
Whatever the venue, however, civil litigation, particularly on be-
half of grievant plaintiffs, had not yet developed into what it has
now become. Brown v. Board of Education13 was decided only in 1954,
and the civil rights litigation elaborating that precedent was only
beginning. A decade later, in 1966, Rule 23 was amended to solidify
the procedural basis of civil rights class actions.' Mass tort class ac-
tions were only experimental at the time,' 5 and the amendment to
Rule 23 only somewhat solidified the procedural basis of such
7. FED. R. Crv. P. 26 (1938) (providing for oral and written depositions "pending ac-
tion"); id. 27 (allowing depositions to perpetuate testimony); id. 30 (establishing procedures




10. SeeArmistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REv. 261, 275-81
(1939).
11. Id. at 271.
12. Id.
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. See, e.g., CHARLus ALAN WRiGHT & ARTHtuR R. Mm.L, 7A FE.ERAL PnRAccE AN f PRo-
cEDURE § 1753 (3d ed. 2005).
15. See, e.g., Darr v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967).
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claims. Class action litigation in federal courts has now survived Ei-
sen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin.1 6
The later 1960s and 1970s brought legislative creation of impor-
tant new federal rights enforceable through civil litigation, notably
voting rights,17 anti-discrimination in employment,18 and the envi-
ronmental legislation19 inspired by the book Silent Spring.20 The
election of Ronald Reagan as President slowed the expansion of
these measures but did not reverse their development. A character-
istic of most of the new regulation was the authorization of private-
party litigation claims as an enforcement device. Reform-minded
civic and political organizations favored such civil litigation
remedies because they were unsure of administrative posture, par-
ticularly under Republican administrations; more conservative leg-
islators favored that method of recourse because they trusted the
courts more than administrative agencies. The plaintiffs' bar fa-
vored recourse through litigation not only for obvious reasons of
professional interest but also on the basis of basic political outlook
and principles.
The total effect has been an explosion in litigation, not so much
in volume as in character. Old-fashioned civil litigation had been
relatively neutral in political significance, conducted in quiet courts
by usually quiet counsel and only a nuisance as far as business inter-
ests were concerned. Civil litigation from the 1970s onward has
been a major political force and hence unavoidably "politicized."
This transformation has been felt in many places in the legal sys-
tem, including federal and state legislatures, federal and state judi-
cial selection procedures, judicial decisions as such, and media
involvement in the "tort wars."
16. 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (imposing tight restrictons on procedure in class certification).
Class-action litigation has also been blessed by Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797
(1985), which commended the function of class suits to permit mass assertion of claims that
individually are too small to prosecute. Id. at 809.
17. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)).
18. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17 (2006)).
19. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2006)); National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat.
852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006)); Endangered Species Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1542
(2006)).
20. RACHEL C.ARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
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The politicization of civil procedure has also been felt in the
process of the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure. Am-
bient political controversy has constrained the possibilities of major
change or reform through that process-for example, in the shift-
ing and uncertain approach to Rule 11 sanctions against frivolous
claims. 21 Nevertheless, the Rules process has maintained a sober,
nonpartisan approach in its work. Its Reporters provide the Com-
mittee not only excellent professional assistance but also important
institutional memory. The membership of the Standing Committee
has been constituted of sober and nonpartisan judges, lawyers, and
academics. The thoughtful and evenhanded competence of Report-
ers such as Edward Cooper has greatly helped the Committee.
21. For a general discussion of some of the criticisms of the Rule 11 amendments, see
CHARLES A WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KkNE, 5A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1332 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2012).
[VOL. 46:2
